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ABSTRACT 
 
Long-haul operations remain crucial to the viability of many of the traditional European ‘flag 
carriers’. An analysis is made of the current services and it is shown that alliances and the recent 
round of airline failures have led to greater concentration on the major hubs. Aircraft and product 
developments are discussed. More non-stop destinations and higher frequencies are expected 
from the major European hubs to other world regions, coupled with increased non-European 
carrier service to second-tier cities in Europe. The scope for a long-haul low-cost airline is 
analysed and traditional operations are shown to be in a relatively stronger position. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The changes taking place in the long-haul aviation arena have been somewhat neglected in recent 
years – the main focus of interest being competition from new entrant ‘low-cost’ carriers on 
short-haul routes. This paper aims to analyse the recent development of long-haul air services in 
  
  
Europe and identify the key changes. Specific attention is then given to the impact of commercial 
factors (e.g. alliances, hubs) and technological issues (in the form of new aircraft types). 
Forecasts of long-haul traffic are discussed and the scope for low-cost airlines in the long-haul 
market is examined. 
 
At the current time, long-haul scheduled air services carry about 1 million passengers per week 
out of Europe on approximately 5000 flights (the same numbers apply in the inbound direction). 
There remains a broadly equal split between European airlines and overseas carriers flying into 
Europe. In some cases this is necessitated by the bilateral air services agreements but even in the 
more competitive markets the market shares have not moved far out of balance. A wide variety 
of aircraft types are used, although the main range is from the Boeing 767 with around 200 seats 
up to the Boeing 747 with 400 seats. 
 
Definitions 
 
For the purposes of the analysis of air services in this paper, the study area for flights from 
Europe is taken to comprise the European Union (as at July 2004) plus the Canary Islands, 
Madeira, Azores, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. The only significant additions outside this 
area in Geographical Europe would be Turkey and Russia west of the Urals. These have been 
omitted, along with other non-EU members in Eastern Europe, because although they have few 
long-haul flights to the Atlantic or Africa, they do have a large number of short routes that cross 
into Asian Russia and the Caucasus. 
 
  
  
Long-haul is taken to be the Association of European Airlines (AEA) definition which includes 
from Europe all Atlantic services, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Australasia. It does not include 
North Africa or the Middle East which are classified as medium-haul. 
 
Services are those which were listed to operate during the first week of July 2004 (1-7 July) in 
the OAG guide. Only non-stop scheduled services from Europe are included. This means that 
each service is only listed once, so for example, a flight that operates Copenhagen-London-Sao 
Paulo-Rio de Janeiro will only appear under London-Sao Paulo. A few services are omitted 
altogether because they stop in the medium-haul area (North Africa or Middle East) en-route or 
make a technical stop only (e.g. Frankfurt-Halifax-Orlando). Code-share flights are only counted 
once – under the European hub airline if they are the operator, as a code-shared flight of the 
European hub airline where they have a code-share but are non-operating and under the 
operating airline elsewhere. Alliance partner’s flights are only counted with the European hub 
airline if they are code-shared (e.g. Delta flying Paris-Cincinnati is included under Air France 
while American flying London-Chicago is not included under BA). Charter services are not 
included in this analysis but are very small in comparison (less than 5% of the scheduled traffic). 
 
THE MAJOR AIRLINES AND AIRPORTS 
 
Although a wide range of airports can support a network of short-haul air services, long-haul 
activity is concentrated on a few major hubs. London Heathrow, Paris CDG, Frankfurt and 
Amsterdam account for 60% of the European long-haul flights with the remaining 40% being 
spread around forty-seven other airports. 
  
  
 
Table 1 shows that London Heathrow is still the primary intercontinental gateway in terms of 
frequencies but Paris CDG and Frankfurt serve more destinations. Amsterdam is the fourth major 
centre. This is partly a result of some very high frequency routes from Heathrow, such as New 
York JFK (128 flights per week - 18 per day) and greater competition as Virgin Atlantic operate 
many sectors as well as British Airways (BA) and the foreign flag carrier. Many routes from 
Frankfurt, in contrast, are monopolies for Lufthansa. This is reflected in the last column of Table 
1 which shows the percentage of flights by the hub airline or its code-share partners. Only 40% 
of long-haul flights at Heathrow carry the BA code, a much less dominant position than its rivals 
- more than two-thirds of long-haul services at Amsterdam and Frankfurt are related to KLM and 
Lufthansa respectively. 
 
There is a clear drop after Amsterdam to a second tier of cities with around 30 long-haul 
destinations each. This includes Madrid, London Gatwick, Rome Fiumicino, Zurich, Milan 
Malpensa and Munich. The remaining airports have very limited long-haul coverage although 
some specialise in particular markets (e.g. South America from Lisbon and Africa from 
Brussels). There are many airports that have just one or two long distance routes: e.g. Cardiff-
Toronto or Stuttgart-Atlanta. 
 
A number of the middle-ranking airports tend to be hubs dominated by the local airline and their 
alliance partners (e.g. Zurich, Munich, Copenhagen). These are not key destinations for other 
foreign airlines coming into Europe, who favour the large origin/destination markets such as 
Rome and Manchester outside the four major hubs. London Gatwick's position has been 
  
  
artificially protected by the Bermuda II air services agreement which means many US routes 
(e.g. Dallas Fort Worth, Minneapolis) cannot operate from Heathrow. With 'open skies' 
approaching from 2008, a number of airlines are planning to move long-haul services to 
Heathrow (Noakes, 2008) and Gatwick is likely to be left with only a handful of leisure routes. 
Regional airports have lost links in recent years to boost the flow through the hubs and it is the 
largest markets that have shown the most growth (Sweetman, 2004, p.30). Services such as 
Bordeaux-New York and Hamburg-Atlanta have disappeared, although Continental and Delta 
are now adding more direct service again from New York, using 757s to small European cities 
such as Bristol and Venice.  
 
= Table 1 about here= 
 
Table 2 shows that three divisions can be identified from the league table of European long-haul 
hub airlines. The four big ones with more than 40 departures per day are Air France at Paris 
CDG, Lufthansa at Frankfurt, BA at London Heathrow and KLM at Amsterdam. The second 
group of mid-size players with 10-20 departures per day includes Iberia at Madrid, Alitalia at 
Milan Malpensa and Rome FCO, Swiss at Zurich, Lufthansa’s second hub at Munich, TAP at 
Lisbon and Austrian at Vienna. 
 
The major hubs have strengthened their position in recent years as previously important rivals 
such as Swiss, Alitalia and Sabena/SN Brussels have lost ground. BA has transferred Gatwick 
flights to Heathrow and Air France has switched Orly flights to CDG. Alderighi and Cento 
(2004) consider the different reactions of airlines to the down-turn in demand post 9/11. 
  
  
 
=Table 2 about here= 
 
The mid-size players look to be the most exposed. Lufthansa’s Munich hub is needed in the short 
term as an overflow to Frankfurt. Lufthansa also has an incentive to keep anyone else from 
developing the lucrative Munich market. Alitalia is making severe losses and has got into a 
messy split hub arrangement between Rome and the new Milan Malpensa airport. Restructuring 
will be necessary and this is likely to see an axe taken to many of these uncompetitive long-haul 
operations. Swissair used to be a major long-haul carrier. The problem for Swiss is that it is 
losing the critical mass required to stay in the game. Somewhat against the trend, Iberia and 
Austrian have both grown rapidly in the long-haul arena. Iberia has taken advantage of the new 
facilities at Madrid Airport and Spain’s historic and linguistic links with Latin America to aim 
for dominance of this market from Europe (Buyck, 2004a). A strategy that seems to have been 
successful is Iberia pulling out altogether from the Far East where it was not very competitive 
and maintaining minimal services to Africa. The South Atlantic offers the potential of higher 
yields, especially to the dominant carrier and Iberia is now one of the most profitable European 
majors. Austrian’s strategy is more difficult to fathom. It would appear that the airline has 
identified long-haul travel as a potentially profitable growth market and aimed to capture a larger 
slice. It has the advantage of an efficient hub but with Austria being a small origin/destination 
market it will inevitably suffer on yields as frequencies are no better than from the main hubs. 
 
The airlines with few or no long-haul services have the opportunity to be niche players—Aer 
Lingus and LOT are good examples serving ethnic flows to North America—although others 
  
  
such as Olympic and Malev may be better off exiting the long-haul sector altogether. SN 
Brussels may have the winning formula—not operating any long-haul routes of their own they 
wet-lease capacity from Birdy Airlines to maintain profitable links to Africa and retain a 
presence on the North Atlantic by code-sharing on flights of American. SN Brussels has returned 
to profitability as a drastically shrunken short-haul airline, in contrast to its erstwhile partner, 
Swiss, which is struggling in no-man’s land. 
 
Almost every European airline nowadays offers daily frequencies across their long-haul network. 
This is in marked contrast to 20 years ago when SAS flew 27 destinations with just 46 weekly 
frequencies. The major exceptions to this rule are SN Brussels with its African routes at sub-
daily frequencies and the medium sized carriers such as Swiss and Alitalia who have a number of 
routes at 4 or 5 times per week, maintaining breadth of coverage ahead of density. Alitalia often 
operates a combined daily service from Milan Malpensa and Rome but uses the alternate hubs on 
different days of the week. 
 
Code-sharing has become a crucial tactic to maintain coverage at the network level while 
controlling capacity and competition at the route level. Table 2 shows that British Airways have 
very few long-haul code-shares operated by other airlines (a mere 5% of their total long-haul 
flights). This is partly down to regulatory constraints but also because BA’s oneworld alliance is 
less closely integrated than its rivals. Lufthansa in contrast has a third of its long-haul services 
from Frankfurt and Munich operated by partner airlines. The smaller hubs (e.g., Copenhagen, 
Lisbon, Dublin) tend to be dominated by the local airline as operating carrier, although some of 
these flights are still code-shared with overseas carriers.  
  
  
 
Table 3 examines the long-haul passenger traffic of the European airlines (the last year the data 
was published in this format was 2002). Please note that these figures are for long-haul services 
only (not complete system traffic). The four largest carriers are once again immediately apparent. 
Virgin Atlantic is in fifth place, ahead of Iberia, Alitalia and Swiss. Overall, AEA airlines long-
haul traffic fell by 5% from 2001 to 2002, several airlines recording major cutbacks (Alitalia, 
Swiss, Olympic, Icelandair and Spanair). The best growth figures were for SAS, Finnair and 
TAP. The airline bmi British Midland had newly entered the long-haul market with only two 
transatlantic routes. Load factors are healthy: an average of 79%. The problem however is that 
only 13% of these passengers were in the premium cabins (first and business class). Lufthansa 
stands out as having 20% premium traffic which should make a considerable difference to yields. 
There is some correlation between size of long-haul operation and proportion of premium traffic, 
suggesting that critical mass is necessary to attract the business passengers. The marginal players 
are mostly struggling to find 6 or 7% premium traffic. LOT Polish carry 97% of their passengers 
in economy class and bmi 96%—it is hardly worth the expense of offering business class at this 
level of take-up! Virgin Atlantic is much weaker on premium traffic than BA, suggesting scale of 
network is important. Some of the smaller airlines partially compensate with higher load factors: 
87% on CSA, 86% on SAS and LOT Polish. BA’s load factor is a relatively poor 75%. This may 
reflect higher yields and/or less use of hub feeder traffic to fill the aircraft. 
 
=Table 3 about here= 
 
RANGE OF SERVICES 
  
  
 
5225 long-haul flights were identified departing from Europe during the first week of July 2004. 
This amounts to some 750 services per day, a formidable level of activity! Table 4 shows that 
60% of these flights are accounted for by the top 20 destinations with the other 40% being spread 
over 158 points. The continued dominance of the North Atlantic is reflected in that 13 of the top 
20 are in the USA or Canada. Bangkok and Tokyo are the most important otherwise. In the US 
market, there is a large fluid demand that can shift around between hubs depending on the supply 
of air services. The rest of the world tends to show more stable long-term trends. 
 
 
=Table 4 about here= 
 
 
Comparing with a study of the North Atlantic ten years ago (Dennis, 1994), it can be seen that 
the traditional gateways (major cities on the east and west coast such as Boston, Los Angeles and 
Miami) have lost ground while the beneficiaries have been hub airports near the east coast 
(Newark, Atlanta, Washington Dulles and Philadelphia) –Table 5. Newark’s expansion has come 
largely at the expense of JFK as both can serve the large local market in New York but Newark 
offers the better onward connections. This has not been enough to displace JFK from first 
position however, although the gap has narrowed considerably. Twenty years ago, more than half 
the total Europe-US traffic passed through New York JFK although this airport mirrored the 
decline of Pan Am and TWA before the latest round of re-organisation. The larger European 
airlines serve both Newark and JFK at least daily. The US carriers have polarised: American and 
  
  
Delta from JFK (United having now more or less given up on this market); Continental from 
Newark. The smaller European airlines have several strategies: moved entirely to Newark (e.g. 
SAS, TAP), remaining at JFK (e.g. Aer Lingus, Austrian) and a muddled operation (e.g. LOT 
whose flight goes to different New York airports depending on the day of the week!). Domestic 
connections are more limited at JFK with non-aligned low-cost start-up Jet Blue being the major 
operator. 
 
=Table 5 about here= 
 
 
The four major European long-haul operators (BA, Air France, Lufthansa and KLM) serve all 10 
destinations in the above list, with the exception only of Philadelphia (no KLM) and Detroit (no 
Air France). A medium sized European airline such as Swiss or Alitalia will serve most of the 
top 10 destinations. The smaller European flag carriers typically serve New York and one or two 
others chosen for their geography, ethnic links, alliance partnership or competitive position. In 
Canada, Toronto is in the networks of all the major airlines and Montreal is a favourite of the 
smaller ones (e.g. Olympic, Austrian, CSA) perhaps due to its importance as an international 
centre.   
 
Impact of Alliances 
 
Alliance development has rationalised long-haul networks in favour of more frequencies and 
capacity on sectors between key alliance hubs in different regions of the world while eliminating 
  
  
thin routes served at low frequency or with multiple stops. These are instead offered via a hub 
connection, which typically provides better journey times and frequencies while losing the 
convenience of a through plane service. The European major airlines have all adopted this 
pattern of service. There are however two major exceptions to this rule. The first is where cargo 
traffic is important – this does not require the daily frequency sought by business passengers and 
airlines such as KLM maintain some low frequency operations with Boeing 747s to meet the 
need of this market (e.g. Amsterdam-Paramaribo in Suriname). The second is services geared 
around ‘visiting friends and relatives’ traffic, typically to locations with specific ethnic links. For 
example, regional airports in the UK to Canada by Air Transat. PIA fly a large number of 
European cities at low frequency from Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi. In some cases PIA is the 
only long-haul service (e.g. Oslo). There are also routes oriented around the holiday market that 
would have formerly operated as charters. These particularly focus on the Caribbean and Florida. 
 
An example of alliance concentration is that KLM and Northwest have dropped services such as 
Detroit-Milan, Minneapolis-Frankfurt and Amsterdam-Orlando in favour of forcing more people 
onto the trunk hub-hub corridor from Amsterdam-Detroit. Morrish and Hamilton (2002) found 
that alliances improve load factors and productivity but most of this is fed back to the consumer 
through fare reductions – as long as the market remains competitive. 
 
There is a belief in the industry – or at least in the financial markets! – that there are too many 
international airlines and what is needed to restore the industry to health is a rash of mergers 
followed by drastic rationalisation. This is a somewhat simplistic analysis as the track-record of 
airline mergers has been very variable. Some, such as USAir-Piedmont have actually served to 
  
  
destroy two perfectly viable airlines! After many years of failed attempts at international mergers 
(SAS-British Caledonian, Alcazar, BA-KLM-Sabena, Air France-Sabena, Swissair-Sabena, BA-
KLM, KLM-Alitalia…) the first big move in Europe came with Air France and KLM merging 
under one holding company in 2004. The repercussions of this will be felt widely. In one swoop, 
four potential global alliances have been reduced to three (Buyck, 2004b). Europe’s two major 
hubs with spare capacity are now under the same control. The expectation in some quarters was 
that Air France would effectively close KLM down (despite short term commitments to maintain 
both hub networks). However, who would be the beneficiaries of this? At least part of the spoils 
would go to BA and Lufthansa. There is still a shortage of hub capacity in northern Europe. 
Analysis by Veldhuis (2004) suggests that Amsterdam may be the more defendable location than 
Paris, precisely because it is a smaller origin/destination market. It is quite likely that Air France 
and KLM will continue their separate lines of development – in which case why merge at all as 
the limited synergies could be realised through a much looser alliance agreement? Certainly, BA 
has looked at other airlines which offer some complementarity (including Swiss) and walked 
away. 
 
Where the alliance impact has been more severely felt is at the junior partners’ base airports. 
Whereas KLM is large enough to hold its own against Air France, SAS has fallen away as a 
long-haul operator in favour of feeding Lufthansa. Alitalia could see a similar relationship 
develop with Air France while Eastern European airlines are being rapidly signed up for alliance 
membership before they obtain any serious long-haul aspirations! 
 
Changes in Traffic and Yields 
  
  
 
Table 6 shows the development in total long-haul passenger traffic of the AEA airlines, load 
factors and passenger yields in real terms (after adjusting for exchange rate fluctuations and 
inflation). These are not perfectly comparable as AEA membership and reporting has varied over 
this time period. They do however enable some broad trends to be identified. Long-haul traffic 
has doubled in the last ten years, a very significant growth despite the current doldrums. Load 
factors have improved by 10 percentage points: we are all travelling in more crowded planes! 
Whereas in 1991, 1 out of 3 seats was empty it is now only 1 out of 5. This can possibly still 
creep a little higher but the realistic maximum for a year-round scheduled operation, with 
availability of seats on demand (albeit at a price!) is probably around 85%. The average cost of 
long-haul travel to the passenger has fallen by about 30% since 1991. This overall trend conceals 
an increase in yields in 2000 and 2001, which has collapsed in the last two years. The strategy 
seems to be ‘pile it high and sell it cheap’! It is only in August 2004 that fare increases (other 
than fuel surcharges) are being mooted once again. KLM claimed that higher demand and strong 
forward bookings meant it could raise prices from Tuesday August 17th by between 1% and 3% 
(Milner, 2004) - the first substantive increase since September 11th 2001! 
 
 
=Table 6 about here= 
 
 
Growth Forecasts 
 
  
  
Table 7 shows that Europe-North America is by far the dominant long-haul market from Europe 
at the current time, accounting for almost half the total passenger kilometres in 2003. Europe-
Africa is in second place overall although these other parts of the world show considerable 
variation by European market: Africa is very important from France, for example, Southwest 
Asia from the UK, Central and South America from Spain. Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia 
traffic is fairly evenly distributed.  
 
Looking ahead to 2023, the growth rates are expected to be higher in some of the other markets 
than the North Atlantic but the differentials are not sufficient to change the ordering by much. 
Most long-haul markets are forecast by Boeing to grow at 5-6% per annum with the highest 
growth in Europe-China (7.4%) and the lowest in Europe-Central America (4.6%).  
 
=Table 7 about here= 
 
AIRCRAFT SIZE AND TYPE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The Boeing 747 (with around 400 seats) dominated long-haul operations in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In 1985, 62% of North Atlantic services were flown with the 747 and its market share was even 
higher in Europe-Asia (Dennis, 1994). The advent of the first long-range twin jets such as the 
Boeing 767 led to frequency being substituted for capacity on the more competitive passenger 
markets such as the North Atlantic. Where bilateral restrictions limited frequency, airport slots 
were in short supply or there was substantial cargo traffic, the Boeing 747 remained dominant 
however. Some airlines (e.g., KLM, Air France, Lufthansa) operate Combi 747s which reduce 
  
  
passenger capacity to 250 seats with main deck cargo space. KLM reconfigures some of these 
aircraft for the summer season when passenger demand is stronger (freight demand is counter-
seasonal, peaking in November-December). 
 
In the last five years, the new generation of long-haul aircraft—Boeing 777, Airbus A330 and 
A340—have acquired an increasing role. They have almost eliminated the remaining tri-jets 
(L1011, DC10 and MD11) on a one-for-one basis as all fall within the 250-300 seat bracket. In a 
few cases they have been used to upgrade services developed with the 767 or A310 as demand 
grows. They have also perhaps more surprisingly been used as 747 replacements (e.g., by British 
Airways who has raided slots at Heathrow from short-haul services and by buying on the grey 
market), enabling further frequency increases. Table 8 shows the long-haul fleets of the 
European major airlines and some contrasting carriers from other parts of the world. 
 
US carriers have almost abandoned the 747 although Asian operators such as JAL, Singapore, 
Air India and Cathay Pacific are still wedded to the type. In Europe the large majors plus Virgin 
Atlantic continue with some 747s, while the smaller long-haul operators generally favour lower 
capacity aircraft. 
 
=Table 8 about here= 
 
Table 9 takes the example of the London-New York route. In 1990, the 747 operated more than 
three in four services (excluding Concorde). By 2004, the 777 has become the most prolific type, 
although BA and Virgin Atlantic are still dominated by 747s. 
  
  
 
The latest development is the use of narrow-bodied aircraft such as the Boeing 757 to maintain 
frequency on thin intercontinental routes up to about 4200 miles. This is the first time since the 
days of the Boeing 707 that a 150 seat aircraft has been operated long-haul on a significant scale. 
A number of airlines found their 757s to be too large for the short-haul market after low-cost 
carriers had eaten into the traffic base. The Boeing 757 had been used in the past by charter 
operators on the North Atlantic and it is the US airlines who have adopted it most 
enthusiastically today. Many of Continental's new services depend upon 757s (e.g., Newark-
Edinburgh, Cleveland-Gatwick). Newark-Gatwick has been increased from two daily flights to 
three but one 777 has been replaced with two 757s; it appears from a cursory look at pricing that 
Continental is able to reduce availability of the lowest yielding fares on the smaller aircraft. 
American has started Boston-Manchester with a 757 and Iberia uses it on routes from Europe to 
Africa such as Madrid-Lagos. The downside of the aircraft is that it has only a single aisle with 3 
seats either side. This creates a rather cramped impression and makes it more difficult for 
passengers to move around the cabin. 
 
=Table 9 about here= 
 
A niche has also been carved out for small narrow-body aircraft such as the A319 and Boeing 
Business Jet—a long-range derivative of the 737 (Aviation Strategy, 2003). Lufthansa converted 
non-hub services from Dusseldorf to Chicago and Newark and have since added Munich to 
Newark. The rationale for Lufthansa is that it can capture the premium market and encourage 
some passengers to trade up from economy to business class if it is the only direct flight 
  
  
available. The lower yielding economy passengers will have to travel one-stop and some of these 
may be lost to rival hubs such as Amsterdam - but this traffic is of little value. Air France have 
adopted a different strategy, using A319-100ERs to add new business class only services to their 
Paris CDG hub. These feature obscure destinations (e.g. Pointe Noire in the Congo and Tashkent 
in Uzbekistan) where there is a market in the oil or construction industries willing to pay a 
substantial premium for a convenient and reliable flight. It is necessary to garner passengers 
from all over Europe to produce a sufficient load, hence the importance of feeder traffic from the 
Air France network at CDG. The airline bmi British Midland has expressed an interest in 
operating long-haul services from Manchester using an A319LR (Kingsley Jones, 2004). This 
envisages a conventional two-class cabin, as there is insufficient premium traffic on these 
regional routes. 
 
Airbus and Boeing have divergent views on the future development of the long-haul market. 
Airbus believes economies of density will be most important and coupled with airline alliances 
this will reinforce the major hubs. Hence the need for the A380, especially as these airports 
become progressively more slot constrained (Sweetman, 2004). Boeing believe that frequency 
and dispersion will be the key drivers with more new non-stop services, hence the demand for 
the Boeing 787 (Pilling, 2004). It is important to note however that many of the new routes the 
787 is likely to be used on will still involve a major hub at one end or the other. There is much 
less scope for pure point-to-point flying in the long-haul arena. Boeing's approach partly reflects 
the US perspective - where frequency is king, cargo is less important and few airports have 
capacity constraints versus the European or Asian situation. Boeing was probably also anxious 
not to lose its large 767 customer base to the mid-range Airbus models although in practice the 
  
  
787 has attracted orders from a much wider background.  
 
There has been less take-up than expected for ultra long-haul non-stop services that have become 
possible with new generation aircraft such as the A340-500 (Thomas, 2005a). Most of the 
potential markets are between Asia and North America. Thai International has withdrawn some 
routes after only a few months, claiming that high fuel prices made them unviable (as they carry 
a weight penalty in the quantity of fuel as well as the need for extra crew). From Europe it is 
only Chile (from Northern Europe) and Australasia that were beyond the reach of conventional 
aircraft. London-Perth non-stop becomes possible with the A340-500 (Flanagan, 2004). A high 
volume of business passengers appears critical to support the higher cost levels of these services, 
which is why Singapore Airlines has adopted a low-density layout with large numbers of 
premium seats. Passengers are also likely to be less enthusiastic about being cooped up in an 
economy class seat for 16 hours at a stretch. 
 
The A380 presence is likely to be greatest on routes between Asia and Europe as these are 
already the preserve of the Boeing 747. Slot constraints and strong traffic levels at London 
Heathrow mean that most of the Asian and Middle Eastern operators will fly the new aircraft 
here, while there are a number of services where two smaller aircraft of the same airline, 
scheduled in close proximity due to time window limitations, could be combined onto one A380. 
Emirates has more than 40 A380s on order which suggests that Dubai is going to become a much 
larger hub (Pinkham, 2003) and this will cause anxiety to every other airline flying between 
Europe and the Far East. 
 
  
  
The North Atlantic has few Boeing 747s in service at the moment and hence is likely to be a 
lower priority candidate for A380s but Lufthansa and Air France may use them on hub to hub 
routes within their respective alliances (e.g. Frankfurt-Chicago). There could be some fifth 
freedom services by carriers such as Singapore Airlines. Airbus forecast that there will be 96 
A380 aircraft operating to or from London Heathrow by 2019, making it the second busiest 
A380 node after Tokyo Narita (Murray, 2000) - even though British Airways has not so far 
ordered the aircraft. 
 
Cabin Services 
 
The on-board product offered on long-haul routes has tended to move in circles. For many years 
in the regulated days of air transport up to around 1980, there were two simple options, economy 
(coach) and first class. Economy passengers paid for entertainment and alcoholic drinks. In the 
1980s, airlines offered a segregated cabin for full-fare economy class travellers which 
subsequently became business or ‘club’ class with better seats than economy and upgraded first 
class to sleeper seats. Economy class passengers gained free drinks and films on most 
international airlines. In the 1990s, further improvements to business class (albeit at escalating 
prices) led some airlines such as Virgin, Delta, KLM and Northwest to abandon first class and 
offer only a choice of premium business class or economy. Others such as BA, American and Air 
France continued with three cabins. It is often business class which is the most profitable 
however as costs from running a separate first class cabin escalate more rapidly than revenues, 
especially if load factors are poor (Lobbenberg and Clapham, 2000). In the last few years, the 
huge gulf in comfort and price between economy and business class has led to some airlines (e.g. 
  
  
BA, Virgin) introducing an intermediate cabin (i.e. premium economy, world traveller plus) – 
once again aimed at full fare economy class travellers!  
 
Economy class is the dominant and growing sector of the market yet few carriers appear to have 
a strategy for this other than by competing on price or network connections. American aimed to 
gain an advantage in 2000-01 by removing seats to improve seat pitch in economy from 31” to 
34” and compensate for this with higher load factors. Other airlines such as Continental claimed 
that passengers valued empty middle seats more highly. American started back-tracking once it 
became apparent that economy class passengers were not sophisticated enough to make this a 
key choice criteria – cutting a few dollars off the price was more effective! The US carriers have 
now started cutting back on frills, with alcoholic drinks chargeable in economy class in some 
cases. BA has axed first class on routes with a poor take-up e.g. London-Montreal, London-
Tampa, Manchester-New York.  American has introduced an all-economy cabin on its new 
Boston-Manchester route, flown with a 757 although this is not ‘no-frills’ (Noakes, 2004a). 
Looking ahead, it seems likely that first class will disappear from all but a handful of routes 
catering for the hyper-elite at a very high price, as the new improved business classes offer a 
very similar experience. On business oriented routes, a premium economy type product is needed 
to coax extra revenue from frequent business travellers whose company travel policy does not 
allow club class travel and also satisfying people who paid significantly more than the cheapest 
excursion fare with something better than a random seat in economy class on long journeys. If 
every airline starts offering this product however, it neutralises any competitive advantage and 
may be seen as simply an extra cost burden. Economy class is unlikely to move to ‘no-frills’ in 
the way it is going in the short-haul markets but airlines have little incentive to upgrade this 
  
  
cabin – most passengers here buy solely on price and don’t stop to think what they are getting for 
it! 
 
SCOPE FOR LOW-COST LONG-HAUL AIRLINES 
 
Although low-cost carriers (LCCs) such as Ryanair, easyJet, Southwest and Jet Blue have been 
making a major impact in the short-haul market, these are all based around A320 and 737 type 
aircraft with a maximum range in normal service of 5 hours. There are few examples to date of 
long-haul low-cost operations although Michael O'Leary (Ryanair CEO) has announced plans to 
enter this arena following the Transtlantic 'open skies' agreement (Aviation Strategy, 2007a). 
Many other long-haul markets are still tightly regulated by bilateral agreements however and it 
may be impossible to obtain the necessary route licences. 
 
It is difficult to obtain such dramatic cost advantages in the long-haul market for a number of 
reasons (Francis et al, 2007; Thomas, 2005b).  
 
Whereas passengers might be happy enough with a high density seating configuration between 
London and Dublin or New York and Orlando this is not true on long-haul routes. A significant 
sector of the market is willing to pay many thousands of pounds for the lie-flat beds at the front 
of the aircraft, which makes it possible to offer economy class seating on a marginal cost basis to 
fill up the back of the plane. Stripping out the First or Business Class and going all economy may 
actually increase the revenue required from each economy class seat. Although 29 inch seat pitch 
is satisfactory on flights of 1-2 hours it is difficult to reduce it below the 31-32 inches offered by 
  
  
the existing operators on long-haul journeys. 'Frills' also become relatively more important, the 
longer the flight. Food must be offered, even if passengers pay for it but this still takes up galley 
space and requires time to clean and cater the aircraft. The number of toilets cannot be reduced 
on longer flights while in-flight entertainment is also more valued but this adds weight and 
complexity to the aircraft. Other Ryanair innovations such as non-allocated seating, non-
reclining seats and an absence of window shades are also likely to be unacceptable. Large 
amounts of checked baggage will still need to be carried on long-haul flights - another service 
the LCCs have tried to minimise. 
 
Whereas in the short-haul markets, LCCs have been able to raise aircraft utilisation dramatically, 
there is little scope for this in long-haul operations (Table 10). Aircraft are already flying all-day 
and all-night and airport turn-arounds are a small part of the total activity. It is impossible to 
avoid the costs of putting crew up away from home. Although the number of cabin crew could be 
reduced to the safety minimum, wage rates are likely to be similar - the major carriers often have 
standardised rates across their fleet which makes them particularly uncompetitive on short-haul 
routes.  
 
Hubs are still essential in the long-haul market. Demand is scattered over a wide range of origins 
and destinations and there are few dense point-to-point routes except from London (where Virgin 
Atlantic already flies) or New York. The secondary airport strategy favoured by Ryanair is less 
effective because fewer airports can handle widebodied aircraft and the cost and time saving 
from using remote airports becomes trivial on a long distance journey. Cargo presents something 
of a dilemma. It is an important revenue earner for intercontinental airlines but it creates 
  
  
handling complications and slows down turn-arounds in a way that the LCCs have been anxious 
to avoid.  
 
Seasonality is another problem. While it is possible to undercut the major carriers in the summer 
season and still be profitable, this is almost impossible to maintain through the thin winter 
months when both demand and fare levels plummet. Thus unless a complementary market can be 
found to utilise the aircraft in winter this is a major barrier to entry. Canadian operator Air 
Transat has existed as a budget carrier (with 9 across seating instead of the normal 8 on the 
A310) on the North Atlantic in Summer with aircraft being redeployed to the Canada-
Caribbean/Florida markets during the winter season. 
 
Calculations (Francis et al, 2007, p. 395) indicate that a no-frills long-haul operation might be 
able to reduce the ticket price by about 20% on the cheapest economy fare but for a much 
inferior quality of service. This is much less than the 40-50% differential obtained in the short-
haul market and is relatively easy for the established airlines to attack by cutting their fares 
slightly. 
 
New long-haul start ups such as Oasis have therefore included business class as a vital part of 
their strategy while the airline which eventually became MaxJet was initially mooted as an all-
economy no-frills operation (Aviation Strategy, 2007b) but greater scope for undercutting the 
existing operators was identified with the all-business class model. Although new start-ups with 
a discount fares proposition may struggle to be profitable themselves, they can still impact on the 
existing major airlines in the one remaining lucrative sector of their business. It may also be 
  
  
necessary to look in a different direction for the biggest threat to the traditional carriers. Emirates 
with its large number of aircraft on order, high density seating layouts, high load factors, low 
labour costs and a favourable tax regime may be the biggest threat to the established players in 
the near future. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
After several difficult years when long-haul air traffic fell below the levels achieved in 2000, 
2004-2006 provided some sort of return to normality on the demand side—although airline cost 
levels and hence profitability have been seriously pressured by high fuel prices. 
 
Whereas a large number of airlines are likely to maintain short-haul networks in Europe, long-
haul travel will be concentrated in the hands of a few key players. There are significant barriers 
to entry in the long-haul market, resulting from the dispersed distribution of demand, alliances 
and frequent flier programmes, slot constraints at major airports and the sheer cost and risk 
involved in building up critical mass. Virgin Atlantic and Emirates have been the only two 
significant long-haul new entrants in the last 20 years. Several European airlines have already 
abandoned the effort to be major long-haul players (e.g., SN Brussels, SAS, Olympic) and settled 
for a niche or feeder role. Others such as Swiss and Alitalia may have to do likewise if they are 
to survive in the longer term. The dilemma is that if long-haul services can be returned to 
profitability, they offer the traditional airlines the opportunity to participate in a more stable and 
less competitive sector of the market. In many respects, it all comes down to hubs and the 
changes being wrought on the industry by the low-cost carriers. As explained above, it is 
  
  
difficult for low-cost airlines to enter the long-haul market but there are bound to be some 
attempts, even if most ultimately end in failure. 
 
The perhaps greater problem is that the low-cost airlines are likely to capture between 30 to 50% 
of the short-haul market for travel within Europe over the next few years. Although some of this 
is new growth, it is undermining the viability of the short-haul networks of the traditional carriers 
through reduced traffic volumes and/or yields. Yet the short-haul networks are essential to feed 
the long-haul networks. Only London is a large enough traffic generator in Europe to support a 
wide range of long-haul services without much feeder traffic. British Airways and Virgin 
Atlantic are therefore in a relatively good position. Elsewhere it is a case of the strong get 
stronger and the weak get weaker. Air France at Paris CDG and Lufthansa at Frankfurt have the 
critical mass to survive as both short-haul and long-haul network carriers, almost regardless of 
any low-cost onslaught. KLM stands a good chance if overall market conditions improve but in 
the event of another downturn the temptation for the merged airline will be to concentrate on 
Paris. The rest are very exposed. To maintain long-haul services elsewhere in Europe, it is 
necessary to either have a strong hub to provide the short-haul feed (the strategy of Austrian, for 
example, which may work but even if they can they fend off the low-cost airlines, the gap in 
scale between them and nearby Lufthansa still leaves a competitive disadvantage) or to have a 
niche ethnic market that is loyal, does not require much feeder traffic and is difficult for other 
airlines to tap. Examples of the latter would be Iberia with its Latin American services or Aer 
Lingus flying to the US. These both have a geographical advantage in that other hubs require 
back-tracking. 
 
  
  
The foreign airlines flying into Europe are likely to rationalise their coverage in favour of the key 
locations within alliance partnerships. The US carriers have already done this; for example 
Northwest only flies two A330s a day to London but a dozen to Amsterdam. With its large 
aircraft orders and strong financial backing, Emirates must be viewed as a serious challenger in 
the Europe-Asia and Europe-Africa markets. Once again this depends on a strong hub and we are 
likely to see secondary European cities own long-haul networks being displaced by a few links to 
key hubs outside the region: Chicago and Newark being other such examples. 
 
Change is not therefore complete and there are other variables that could impact on the final 
picture. If Heathrow and Frankfurt are successful in obtaining new runways, that will make the 
going harder for everyone else. If no new runways are built, there will be an overflow that will 
trickle down to the next tier of hubs. Some things are certain however: ruthless attention to cost 
levels coupled with astute commercial planning will be necessary to ensure success in this 
challenging business environment. 
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Table 1. Long-haul services (all carriers) by European airport – July 2004 
 
Airport Non-stop
destinations
Weekly
frequencies
% hub airline or
code-share
London Heathrow 71 1125 40
Paris CDG 78   806 62
Frankfurt 81   671 69
Amsterdam 60   480 67
Madrid 30   276 54
London Gatwick 32   244 21
Rome Fiumicino 34   165 44
Zurich 25   164 70
Milan Malpensa 35   153 75
Munich 33   136 76
Manchester 18   108 19
Paris Orly 11   107 41
Lisbon 15     98 77
Vienna 14     74 96
Brussels 15     67 48
Copenhagen 11     66 83
Shannon 8     49 51
Dublin 7     40 55
Helsinki 7     35 100
Glasgow 6     33 21
31 Others   328
TOTAL 5225
Source: Compiled from OAG data 
  
  
Table 2. Long-haul service by European airlines from their hub airports – July 2004 
 
European Airline Non-stop destinations a Weekly 
frequencies a 
% non-operated 
codeshare
Air France (Paris CDG) 65 503 18
Lufthansa (Frankfurt) 43 462 31
BA (London Heathrow) 46 445   5
KLM (Amsterdam) 42 321 25
Iberia (Madrid) 20 150 14
Alitalia (Milan MXP) 17 115 20
Swiss (Zurich) 18 115 24
Lufthansa (Munich) 18 103 35
TAP (Lisbon) 14   75   8
Alitalia (Rome FCO) 13   72 42
Austrian (Vienna) 14   71 28
SAS (Copenhagen)   8   55   0
BA (London Gatwick)   8   51   0
Air France (Paris Orly)   4   44   0
Finnair (Helsinki)   7   35   0
SN Brussels (Brussels) 10   32 100
Icelandair (Reykjavik)   5   30   0
Aer Lingus (Shannon)   4   25   0
LOT (Warsaw)   4   24   0
Aer Lingus (Dublin)   4   22   0
a Including code-shares 
Source: Compiled from OAG data 
  
  
Table 3. European airlines’ long-haul traffic 2002 
 
Airlinea Revenue 
Passenger Km 
(billion) 
% change
from 2001
Passenger load 
factor % 
% of passengers 
in premium 
cabins
Brit Airways 76 -4 75 15
Air France 73 4 81 14
Lufthansa 66 3 83 20
KLM 45 -2 82 10
Virgin Atlantic 27 -3 81 7
Iberia 22 0 77 11
Alitalia 14 -27 78 9
Swiss 13 -39 80 16
SAS 10 22 86 13
Austrian 9 -5 78 7
TAP 6 13 75 9
Finnair 3 25 81 7
LOT 3 1 86 3
Olympic 3 -18 76 9
Icelandair 1 -22 75 8
Bmi 1 94 66 4
CSA 1 4 87 8
SN Brussels 1 Na 53 9
Malev 1 -8 72 6
Spanair >0.5b -89 55 6
AEA totalc 382 -5 79 13
aAer Lingus data not available 
b less than 500 million 
c includes Tarom and Turkish 
 
Source: AEA 
  
  
Table 4. Top 20 long-haul destinations from Europe by number of flights 
 
Destination Flights in first week of July 2004
New York JFK 463
New York Newark 277
Chicago O’Hare 262
Toronto  207
Atlanta 168
Washington Dulles 168
Bangkok 161
Tokyo Narita 160
Boston 138
Singapore 136
Los Angeles 125
Philadelphia 112
Montreal Dorval 104
Sao Paulo 104
Hong Kong 100
Miami   95
Johannesburg   90
Beijing   89
San Francisco   77
Detroit   70
158 Others 2119
TOTAL 5225
Source: Compiled from OAG data 
  
  
Table 5. US transatlantic gateways 
 
US Gateway from Europe Rank in 2004 Rank in 1994
New York JFK 1 1
New York Newark 2 5
Chicago O’Hare 3 2
Atlanta 4 7
Washington Dulles 5 8
Boston 6 4
Los Angeles 7 3
Philadelphia a 8  
Miami 9 6
San Francisco 10 10
a not in top 10 in 1994 
Source: Compiled from OAG and US Department of Transportation data 
  
  
Table 6. European airlines’ long-haul traffic and yields 1991-2002 
 
Year Revenue Passenger 
Km (billion)
Passenger load 
factor %
Passenger yield 
US ¢ per RPK 
In real terms 
1991 182 68 6.74 
1992 207 70 5.88 
1993 224 70 6.19 
1994 244 73 5.92 
1995 270 74 5.61 
1996 293 75 5.40 
1997 322 77 5.39 
1998 345 76 5.11 
1999 373 75 4.86 
2000 399 78 5.03 
2001 402 76 5.24 
2002 382 79 4.86 
RPK Revenue Passenger Km 
Source: AEA 
 
  
  
Table 7. Boeing traffic forecasts 2003-2023 
 
Regional Flowa 2003
Thousand Billion RPK
2023
Thousand Billion RPK
Average annual % 
growth
Europe- 
North America 
348 903 4.9
Europe- 
Africa 
99 269 5.1
Europe-Southeast 
Asia 
95 253 5.0
Europe- 
Central America 
73 177 4.6
Europe- 
South America 
49 171 6.4
Europe- 
Northeast Asia 
48 175 6.7
Europe- 
China 
34 143 7.4
Europe-Southwest 
Asia 
29 95 6.0
RPK Revenue Passenger Kilometres 
a Europe-Oceania data was not available 
Source: Boeing Current Market Outlook 
 
  
  
Table 8. Principal long-haul fleets (excluding pure freighters) - 2004 
 
Airline B747 MD11 A340 A330 A310 B777 B767
British Airways 57 43 20
Air France 24 22  11 24  
Lufthansa 30 37   6   2  
KLM 22 10   5 12
Swiss    4   7   9  
Alitalia     9 12
Austrian    4    4   3   5
Iberia   6 21  
TAP    4   6  
SAS    7   4    9
Virgin Atlantic 15 15  
American  45 73
Delta    8 118
Singapore 30   3 52 
JAL 53  3 19 29
Source: Flight World Airline Directory 2004 
  
  
Table 9. London-New York services by aircraft type 
 
Airline 1990 2004 
TWA 14x747, 14xL10  
Pan Am 21x747  
American  41x777 
United  7x777, 7x767 
Continental 7x747 14x777 
British Airways 21x747, 14xSSC, 14xL10 42x747, 26x777 
Virgin Atlantic 18x747 21x747, 14x340 
Air India 7x747 7x747 
Kuwait Airways 3x747 3x777 
El Al 3x747  
TOTAL 94x747, 28xL10, 14xSSC 70x747, 91x777, 14x340, 
7x767 
Source: Compiled from OAG data 
  
  
 Table 10. Utilisation of short-haul and long-haul aircraft 
 
Airline Boeing 737-
300 
daily 
utilisation 
hours 
Europe
passenger load 
factor 
%
Boeing 747-
400
daily 
utilisation
hours
Long-haul 
passenger 
load factor 
% 
Air France 7.6 a 65 14.1 81 
British 
Airways 
7.6  62 12.0 75 
British 
Midland 
6.5  60  
KLM 7.1  71 15.0 82 
Lufthansa 7.1  62 15.3 83 
Virgin Atlantic  14.6 81 
easyJet 11.0  81  
Go 9.4  75  
Ryanair 8.8 b  74  
a A320 
b B737-800 
Source: Compiled from IATA, AEA and CAA Statistics 
 
